Bitcoin Not Going Away, Forks Are FUD Projects: Oleg Andreev

Oleg Andreev: "Bitcoin scales pretty well."

Oleg Andreev: submitted by a56fg4bjgm345 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

A Response to Oleg Andreev's Bitcoin Maximalism

Let me begin by saying that I have great respect to Oleg, and that he undoubtedly knows vastly more about the technical details of Bitcoin and software development than I do. So, I don't take challenging his views on Bitcoin lightly.
At the same time, I think that I understand network effects, the history of disruptive technologies and human nature well enough to question the logic and conclusion of his recent post on Bitcoin Maximalism (http://blog.oleganza.com/post/140634349543/bitcoin-maximalism). While I actually hope that Oleg is right in his conclusion that Bitcoin is indomitable, I'm concerned that he and other long-time Bitcoin maximalists are presently engaging in the all-too-natural human tendency of "whistling through the graveyard" rather than acting nimbly to scale Bitcoin as soon as possible.
Oleg's case for Bitcoin maximalism hinges upon three key assumptions: (1) that the dominate blockchain will always be the most secure one, (2) that Bitcoin can and will adapt quickly enough to avoid being overtaken by any initially-less-secure-but-more-agile competitor, and (3) that Bitcoin's failure to dominate would so undermine trust in consensus blockchains in general that none could successfully supersede it.
Unfortunately, none of these assumptions are likely valid for reasons I will explain.
While I agree that the dominant blockchain will likely be the most secure at scale, nothing permits me to believe that it will start as such, and the history of disruptive technologies suggests strongly otherwise.
Successfully disruptive technologies have several well-documented characteristics (see, e.g., the books "Zero to One" by Peter Theil or "Exponential Organizations" by Salim Ismail, or this article in Harvard Business Review: https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation). Disruptive technologies, by definition, do not succeed by attacking establishment business models directly and from the outset. Rather, they establish beachheads in new, unassuming and initially nonthreatening markets. As they experience growth in these areas, the technology gets refined, quality improves, and even more novel use cases become apparent. A virtuous cycle ensues.
These improvements in quality (or in the case of blockchains, security) are deceptively immaterial at first but proceed exponentially nonetheless. With disruptive technologies, quality eventually becomes "good enough" that it begins taking market share from entrenched interests in mature markets due to its lower cost, even though such markets were not its original target and even though it's is still qualitatively inferior. And then, eventually, a tipping point occurs: The quality produced by the new technology comes to match or exceed that offered by the old, but still at a lower cost. Total disruption ensues.
Despite that nearly everyone recognizes Bitcoin's extremely disruptive potential, it has failed to follow this well-known disruptive trajectory. Seven years in, Bitcoin still lacks even its first "killer application". How can this be?
The answer seems clear: While potentially disruptive by nature, Bitcoin has not been deployed in a disruptive manner. Rather than first targeting undeveloped markets and novel use cases for blockchain technology, Bitcoin Bitcoin aims at the very heart of the establishment by seeking to disrupt money itself, even to the exclusion of initially more modest and unassuming opportunities. Attacking the establishment at its core is undoubtedly a ballsy approach, but it is not a disruptive one.
In fact, money myopia limits Bitcoin's disruptive potential in several important ways.
First, money myopia makes many Bitcoiners hostile to non-monetary uses of the Bitcoin blockchain, with many of them deriding most all non-monetary uses as "spam". And yet, it's exactly these novel, unassuming, non-monetary use cases where we would expect any truly disruptive blockchain technology to first establish itself, and where blockchains will almost certainly find their first "killer app". Bitcoin has no killer app to date because it has neglected, indeed derided, these novel uses in favor of preparing for direct battle with the establishment in its most fortified citadel--money.
Second, money myopia causes even those Bitcoiners who value non-monetary use cases to overweight the importance of security (quality) and underweight the importance of adaptability (usefulness) and low cost. By definition, truly disruptive technologies are always built on the latter two attributes (high adaptability/usefulness and low cost) and never the former (high initial quality).
Confidence in Bitcoin's ability to strike directly at the core of the establishment, at money, rather than evolving in a truly disruptive way by supporting more unassuming use cases, is anchored in a nearly-religious conviction by many Bitcoiners that, in free markets, "good money always drives out the bad", and that bitcoin is the best money ever invented. Many Bitcoiners actively anticipate an imminent fiat apocalypse, which will be quickly followed by the Second Coming of commodity money in the form of bitcoin.
However, even if true, the final fall of fiat could take decades during which a more useful and adaptable (though initially less secure) competitor to Bitcoin becomes the universal public blockchain (thanks to insurmountable network effects fueled by novel use cases). Such a competitor won't challenge the establishment directly, and therefore won't initially share Bitcoin's aspirations as money. Rather, like most disruptive technologies, it will gain a foothold in less threatening ways--for instance by establishing itself as the backbone of the Internet of Things; by better and more cheaply facilitating registration, identity, escrow, or clearing services; by making smart contracting easy and seamless; by hosting numerous important and influential Distributed Autonomous Organizations; by being the most accessible and useful blockchain platform for developers, etc.
While initially lagging Bitcoin at first, the quality (security) of this competitor will improve consistently and exponentially over time. As it does so, even more use cases will become apparent. Eventually, and likely far sooner than any anticipated fiat apocalypse, the security of this competitor will become good enough that it begins taking market share from entrenched interests in mature markets (including Bitcoin's market) as a consequence of its lower cost and "good enough security", even though such markets were never its original target. And then, eventually, a tipping point will occur: The quality/security of the competitor will match or exceed that offered not just by Bitcoin, but by the old fiat currencies as well, but still at a lower cost. At that a point, total disruption is nigh and a new money is potentially born.
Oleg insists that we needn't worry about alternative cryptocurrencies proceeding via this disruptive trajectory to gain an insurmountable advantage over Bitcoin because the competitive advantages of any such competitors will, "with full support from all major [bitcoin] holders", quickly be subsumed into Bitcoin via defensive hard or soft forks.
Perhaps. But given recent history, why should we have any confidence in Bitcoin's ability to agilely implement defensive forks in a timely manner? After all, humans have an uncanny ability to rationalize away threats until those threats are too great to overcome. This is, after all, the secret to every disruptive technology's success. This rationalizing tendency is troubling enough when just a small group of knowledgable decision makers must be persuaded to act to defensively, but the challenge is exponentially greater when "75%", or even "overwhelming consensus", is required (as is currently the case with most all proposed Bitcoin hard forks).
I submit that it's only a matter of time before remaining competitive in the blockchain space will require repeated nimble hard forks and not merely soft ones. And yet, given that humans rarely act with "overwhelming consensus" except in matters so trivial as to be inconsequential or of such grave importance as to constitute a clear and present existential threat, I'm doubtful of Bitcoin's ability to defensively outmaneuver an approaching threat. When existential threats approach exponentially, as they do in network-effect driven technologies like blockchains, the danger may not be "clear and present" enough to forge hard-fork consensus until it's already too late.
Oleg then extends his arguments in defense of Bitcoin maximalism by taking some shots at the only visible threat to Bitcoin maximalism currently, Ethereum. Some of his criticisms of Ethereum are accurate and some are not. But, they are mostly irrelevant regardless.
For instance, even if true, none of his criticisms prevent Ethereum from gaining a beachhead in unassuming niches only to later disrupt Bitcoin as the dominant form of crypto money (assuming sufficient improvements in quality/security over time). For instance, should Ethereum's market cap and fabulous PR continue during a time when Bitcoin's price takes a precipitous fall--perhaps due to the latter's real or perceived intractability--resulting bandwagon and network effects may be too much for Bitcoin to overcome.
Given that the social and economic influence of current Bitcoin stakeholders is trivial compared to the overall size of the blockchain marketplace opportunity, especially when non-monetary use cases are considered, the winner of the Blockchain race will be determined not by existing Bitcoin stakeholders, as Oleg suggests, by the coming tidal wave of new blockchain adopters (both corporate and individual). If history is any guide (consider how Web 2.0 developed, for example), these new adopters are likely to be swayed more by irrational factors like branding, reputation, peer pressure, usefulness and familiarity than by reasoned judgement or a critical analysis of the security features of each platform. Since most new users won't be looking to use blockchains as money initially, they will not share Core's security-at-all-costs biases and will instead favor the most accessible, useful and popular platforms.
Given how Bitcoin stakeholders are currently managing the platform, Bitcoin will almost certainly not be the most accessible, useful, and popular blockchain, at least when nonmonetary uses are considered. Bitcoin's insistence on extreme security limits its usefulness for all the many potential non-monetary uses noted above, making less expensive and more nimble options more appealing in these important use cases.
Consequently, Bitcoin's ultimate success as money hinges almost entirely upon the technical impossibility of any more nimble blockchain ever achieving Bitcoin's level of quality and security, or else upon the quasi-religious conviction of Bitcoiners that good money drives out not only the bad, but also the "good enough" version that any successful blockchain is likely to offer.
In a last ditch defense of Bitcoin maximalism, Oleg finally argues that markets abandoning Bitcoin for something else like Ethereum would be "eternal proof that [blockchain] consensus [mechanisms are] not safe long-term and can be sabotaged infinite number of times to satisfy politics du jour", rendering them all useless. Essentially, he argues that if Bitcoin can't be the main universal blockchain forever and always by insulating itself from social whims, then the loss of confidence in blockchain consensus algorithms in general will be such that none other could supersede it.
This fixation with making Bitocoin immune from social whims and preferences is troubling. Contrary to common wisdom, blockchains are not secured by hashing but rather by economics. Without a market for mined coins, mining doesn't happen in sufficient quantity to secure the network. Over any reasonable time frame, the security of the Bitcoin network is therefore a direct function of the market value of the coins mined. This recognition that blockchains are ultimately secured by the economic value of their tokens and not by hashing is one reason why a well-conceived and implemented Proof of Stake algorithm stands at least a fighting chance of superseding more resource-intensive Proof of Work methodologies.
Regardless, the key insight is that markets don't exist separate and apart from humans. Markets are complexly socially-determined, and therefore subject to all the extremes of human emotions (bubbles and crashes, for example.)
Consequently, Oleg's contention that that the one true blockchain will be the most immune from social influences, or else that all blockchains will be proven worthless for failing to sufficiently resist them, contains an inherent logical contradiction: Only a blockchain immune from market influence, and therefore lacking sufficient market value, can be mostly free of social influences. By definition, any such blockchain will be highly insecure.
It is unlikely therefore that the universal public blockchain will be the most removed and insulated from societal influences. Rather, it will thrive upon social factors, becoming a creature of it. Such a blockchain will be "secure enough" to resist censorship by empowered minorities (even nation states) while also proving adaptable to the whims of the worldwide economic majority. The latter (social adaptability and usefulness) gives the blockchain token economic value while the former (censorship resistance) serves to preserve said value indefinitely, preventing those in power from co-opting or skimming it.
Oleg's idea that the markets must find the right balance between adaptability, low cost and security on the first attempt or not at all is unsupported by history or logic. As always, markets will proceed via trial-and-error, via "discovery", until the proper balance is achieved. As with any discovery process, there will likely be spectacular failures along the way, but these failures won't permanently tarnish the reputation and usability of blockchains anymore than early plane crashes permanently tarnished the reputation and usability of airplanes.
In the end, the question we should all be asking ourselves is simply this: Which implementation of blockchain technology is most likely to first strike the socially-useful balance between "good enough" security, high adaptability/usefulness and low cost? Will it be the most secure but least adaptable and more expensive implementation, or will it be a more adaptable but inexpensive and reasonably secure one that improves over time?
If the history of disruptive technology is any guide, the answer is obvious: The winning platform is almost certain to be the one that costs less and iterates the fastest. Anytime finding the right answer to question depends upon rolling dice (discovery), the person (or implementation) rolling the fastest usually wins. Free markets invariably outperform command-and-control ones simply because the former sees vastly more rolls of the dice in a given amount of time.
In conclusion, quality/security, adaptability/usefulness and low cost are competing objectives in the blockchain space. Because finding the right balance between them will almost certainly be a result of trial and error, of discovery, the winner of the blockchain battle isn't likely to gain scale as the most secure, expensive and intractable option, but rather as the cheapest and most adaptable while being "secure enough" initially for niche uses.
Then, like with all disruptive technologies, quality (security) will improve over time, resulting in even more use cases, more social acceptance, more economic value, and therefore more security. Eventually, it's security will rival Bitcoin's and then even that of fiat currencies, at which point it will have the social acceptance, economic might, and network effect advantages to serve as a funding currency for speculative attacks on fiat. If those attacks are sufficiently successful, it may well inherit Bitcoin's dream of becoming the new stateless currency.
Bitcoin's fate is not yet sealed. It still has huge network effect advantages that can be exploited. But, those advantages won't long persist if Bitcoin doesn't make itself more usable for non-monetary purposes, even at the cost of a little less security in the short-term.
submitted by Wefivekings to ethereum [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev: "Bitcoin is a much better store of wealth than gold, paintings and vacant homes, yet people argue about sacrificing it for retail payments."

Oleg Andreev: submitted by eragmus to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev: "Bitcoin is a much better store of wealth than gold, paintings and vacant homes, yet people argue about sacrificing it for retail payments."

Oleg Andreev: submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev: "Bitcoin scales pretty well."

Oleg Andreev: submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

This is a must read response to Bitcoin Maximalists. Highly informative and worth the read.

I was searching through /ethereum and found this Gem that received little to no attention that it deserved. I mean seriously amazing analysis and should be stickied and placed on the sidebar. Note, I didn't write this, but was impressed and saddened it didn't receive more attention.
This article will be my go to response for those struggling to understand why Bitcoin will most likely fail, and why Ethereum is a better bitcoin than bitcoin.
My own addition to what is in the article is simply this: Intrinsic use-cases are what made all currencies into currencies (unless you're talking about fiat which was brought about by government force). Bitcoin tried to be a currency by 'fiat' with no other use-case just like government fiat. Natural currencies don't ever happen that way...
submitted by 3rdElement to ethtrader [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev: World needs independent digital money with unbreakable rules. So far Bitcoin is the most rigid. Every failure to HF adds to the promise.

Oleg Andreev: World needs independent digital money with unbreakable rules. So far Bitcoin is the most rigid. Every failure to HF adds to the promise. submitted by tasmannn to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

'Red Pill for Newbies' - Oleg Andreev - Bitcoin is not compatible with the State

'Red Pill for Newbies' - Oleg Andreev - Bitcoin is not compatible with the State submitted by xcsler to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev - Why Bitcoin is called Bitcoin

Oleg Andreev - Why Bitcoin is called Bitcoin submitted by Uptrenda to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev - Original vision of Bitcoin

Oleg Andreev - Original vision of Bitcoin submitted by S_Lowry to btc [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev: "On-chain smart contracts should be limited to verification (vs arbitrary computation). Chain & Bitcoin do it right."

Oleg Andreev: submitted by a56fg4bjgm345 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev equivocates on monetary vs. other protocol rules: "World needs independent digital money with unbreakable rules. So far Bitcoin is the most rigid. Every failure to HF adds to the promise."

Oleg Andreev equivocates on monetary vs. other protocol rules: submitted by ForkiusMaximus to btc [link] [comments]

Deploying CT in Bitcoin without extension blocks? | Oleg Andreev | Apr 13 2017

Oleg Andreev on Apr 13 2017:
(This is a sketch, not a fully-formed proposal, just to kick off the discussion.)
Confidential Transactions (by GMaxwell & Poelstra) require a new accounting model,
new representation of numbers (EC points as Pedersen commitments) and range proofs
per number. Setting aside performance and bandwidth concerns (3-4Kb per output,
50x more signature checks), how would we deploy that feature on Bitcoin network
in the most compatible manner?
I'll try to present a sketch of the proposal. I apologize if this discussion already
happened somewhere, although I couldn't find anything on this subject, apart from Elements
sidechain proposal, of course.
At first glance we could create a new extblock and transaction format, add a protocol to
"convert" money into and from such extblock, and commit to that extblock from the
outer block's coinbase transaction. Unfortunately, this opens gates to a flood of
debates such as what should be the block size limit in such block, should we
take opportunity to fix over 9000 of pet-peeve issues with existing transactions
and blocks, should we adjust inflation schedule, insert additional PoW, what would
Satoshi say etc. Federated sidechain suffers from the same issues, plus adds
concerns regarding governance, although it would be more decoupled, which is useful.
I tried to look at a possibility to make the change as compatible as possible,
sticking confidential values right into the existing transaction structure and
see how that would look like. As a nice bonus, confidential transactions would have
to fit into the hard-coded 1 Mb limit, preserving the drama around it :-P
We start with a segwit-enabled script versioning and introduce 2 new script versions:
version A has an actual program concatenated with the commitment, while version B
has only the commitment and allows mimblewimble usage (no signatures, non-interactive
cut-through etc). Legacy cleartext amount can nicely act as "min value" to minimize
the range proof size, and range proofs themselves are provided separately in the
segregated witness payload.
Then, we soft fork additional rules:
  1. In non-coinbase tx, sum of commitments on inputs must balance with sum of commitments
    on the outputs plus the cleartext mining fee in the witness.
  2. Range proof can be confidential, based on borromean ring signature.
  3. Range proof can be non-confidential, consisting of an amount and raw blinding factor.
  4. Tx witness can have an excess value (cf. MW) and cleartext amount for a miner's fee.
  5. In coinbase tx, total plaintext reward + commitments must balance with subsidy,
    legacy fees and new fees in the witness.
  6. Extra fees in the witness must be signed with the excess value's key.
The confidential transactions use the same UTXO set, can be co-authored with plaintext inputs/outputs
using legacy software and maybe even improve scalability by compressing on-chain transactions
using mimblewimble cut-through.
The rules above could have been made more complicated with export/import logic to allow users
converting their coins to and from confidential ones, but that would require
more complex support from miners to respect and merge outputs representing "plaintext value bank",
mutate export transactions, which in turn requires introduction of a non-malleable TxID
that excludes miner-adjustable export/import outputs.
The rules above have a nice side effect that miners, being the minters of confidential coins,
can sell them at a premium, which creates an incentive for them to actually support
that feature and work on improving performance of rangeproof validation (e.g. in GPUs).
Would love to hear comments and criticism of that approach.
Thanks!
Oleg.
original: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014144.html
submitted by dev_list_bot to bitcoin_devlist [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Not Going Away, Forks Are FUD Projects: Oleg Andreev

Bitcoin Not Going Away, Forks Are FUD Projects: Oleg Andreev submitted by BCCnews to Bitcoincash [link] [comments]

'Red Pill for Newbies' - Oleg Andreev - Bitcoin is not compatible with the State

'Red Pill for Newbies' - Oleg Andreev - Bitcoin is not compatible with the State submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev - Bitcoin is not compatible with the State

Oleg Andreev - Bitcoin is not compatible with the State submitted by n8n3k to Anarcho_Capitalism [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev: "On-chain smart contracts should be limited to verification (vs arbitrary computation). Chain & Bitcoin do it right."

Oleg Andreev: submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev on Twitter: "[email protected] e.g. add Zerocash features to Bitcoin as a soft fork: users run zkSNARK proofs, miners commit to used up serial numbers."

Oleg Andreev on Twitter: submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev - Why Bitcoin is called Bitcoin

Oleg Andreev - Why Bitcoin is called Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Deploying CT in Bitcoin without extension blocks? | Oleg Andreev | Apr 13 2017 /r/bitcoin_devlist

Deploying CT in Bitcoin without extension blocks? | Oleg Andreev | Apr 13 2017 /bitcoin_devlist submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev: World needs independent digital money with unbreakable rules. So far Bitcoin is the most rigid. Every failure to HF adds to the promise.

Oleg Andreev: World needs independent digital money with unbreakable rules. So far Bitcoin is the most rigid. Every failure to HF adds to the promise. submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Oleg Andreev on Twitter: "[email protected] e.g. add Zerocash features to Bitcoin as a soft fork: users run zkSNARK proofs, miners commit to used up serial numbers."

Oleg Andreev on Twitter: submitted by Egon_1 to btc [link] [comments]

Today in Bitcoin (2018-02-15) - Bitcoin is noxious poison - Fake Nice & Subterfuge - $10K+? #Bitcoin2014 - Panel: Bitcoin - The Wish List Marlin: Preprocessing zkSNARKs with Universal and Updatable SRS - Pratyush Mishra Andreev Oleg - YouTube Why Governments Can't Stop Bitcoin

Chain architect and entrepreneur Oleg Andreev has said that in spite of “FUD,” markets have accepted Bitcoin is “not going away.” In a series of tweets outlining the short-term prospects for the BTC chain, Andreev demonstrated recent price action was to an extent due to various industry actors’ decisions. “At this point (2016-2017) it’s pretty much settled that Bitcoin is not ... Oleg Andreev Contract for Bitcoin banking transactions. Rohit Tripathy. Follow. Jan 2, 2018 · 4 min read. One of the problems with purchase and sale transactions of Bitcoins is the dependency on ... Oleg Andreev. Software designer and Bitcoin expert. With rich background in web design, managing high load systems and end-user application design, I am standing on the intersection of UX and strong cryptosystems. To make cryptographic schemes and protocols actually work, they need to be designed from the beginning with the user interface in mind. Oleg Andreev on Bitcoin Protocol architect at Interstellar Bitcoin is simultaneously the most direct attack on the state (it's the only thing that will necessarily shrink the empires), and also the most indirect: it's a gigantic workaround for the civilized society to slowly exit the entire pyramid of coercion without a single gun fire. Oleg Andreev Blog - Blog of hardcore developer, product architect at Chain

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Today in Bitcoin (2018-02-15) - Bitcoin is noxious poison - Fake Nice & Subterfuge - $10K+?

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